This post is part of a series where I try to make outlandish predictions for 2008. Read the introduction for more details.
By the time you read this, a over a week will have passed and a week is a long time in politics. Maybe something will happen during the Iowa and New Hampshire primaries to shake things up a bit.
9. Social networking will become a protocol
We each meet more new people each year than my great-grandparents would have known in their entire lifetime. Not only that, but on the whole, you will meet a completely different set of new people than your best friends will, so the traditional shared memory of small communities does not help you. Human evolution has not yet caught up with this situation and the result is social amnesia - we cannot immediately recall all the details about all the people we have known. One way of coping is to keep really good diaries, something sadly I have hitherto failed to achieve. Another recent help is social networking sites.
I don't need Facebook to talk to people that I see in my daily life, I also don't need Facebook to interact with geeky friends, everything Facebook can do, something more efficient and less time-consuming can do. Facebook is, however, marginally useful to interact with non-geeks that I went to University with.
The current unique selling point of a service like Facebook or Myspace is that it bundles several functions together in a way that can be easily used by smart but technically dis-interested users and everything is nicely abstracted away behind consistent menus.
I, and perhaps other people, have been saying this for a while, but I still believe that social networking will eventually become a protocol. When you remove all the glitz from social networking sites, at the core are a few very basic functions:
For the sake of this article, the last three are thoroughly uninteresting, email and the web solve these problems far more efficiently than any walled garden social networking service can do.
The first two are the ones that interest us here, it is the 'friends list' that is the selling point of site like Facebook. The problem with the 'friends list' is that it is site-specific. When the next cool social networking site comes out, you have to rebuild your list from scratch. So one could end up with half-a-dozen different overlapping but not identical friends-lists on different networks. Remembering where the heck a specific half-forgotten person is, which of the six lists, removes the convenience that is the main foundation of a social-networking site.
So there is a tipping point, where the cost of entry and exit from these social networking sites outweighs their utility. The exact point will vary across individuals, according to how much of a real offline life they have.
The way to square the circle is to make your friends list more independent of the web application that you currently have in front of you. The answer is not Google's OpenSocial, it is not Microsoft's Passport, or any vendor specific service. It will be a simple protocol that allows you to sync your friends-list between different web applications, instant messaging applications, email accounts, photo sharing sites and so on. A protocol that the majority of its users won't even realise they are using.
I don't think the answer is OpenID, but the answer is something like it or something on top of it. The reason that OpenID is good is that anyone can implement OpenID. So normal people can use their account at web service A, for web services B, C, D, E and F; with minimal form-filling in the process. On the other side, any website can accept OpenID, from an established headline site down to a blog, no permission or licence is required from anyone.
The problem is that, as far as I can tell, OpenIDs do not necessarily map to a way of contacting people. If an OpenFriendList protocol was based on OpenID, then a web application, when given an arbitrary list of OpenIDs, would need to be able to send a message to an OpenID and expect it to go somewhere. The somewhere can change depending on the end user, they could have the messages go into their Facebook inbox, into their email, or onto their mobile phone. The main thing is that you can shoot text at an OpenID and expect it to be delivered.
Anyhow, I expect someone smarter than me will solve this problem in 2008 and no doubt become a millionaire in the process.
10. Mitt Romney becomes the president of the United States
You can't be a really blogger unless you make a guess about the US Election, even if you have no political knowledge or know nothing about America.
Both main US parties are far more right-wing than any party you will find in Europe (give or take a few Nazis), so there is not that much to divide them on policy. None of the candidates will propose to nationalise medicine or have the tax rates and redistribution of income that all Western European countries have. So in the end, it comes down to personality.
The problem is at the moment there are fifteen declared candidates and a few in the wings, so you might as well pick a name out of the hat at this point. So if I really have to choose a winner, I'll go for Mitt Romney.
Mitt Romney ticks all the boxes that American voters seem to want. He is white, male, well spoken and looks mature but not haggard and elderly like many of the other candidates. He has five kids and a good looking wife who can create recipes and train horses. Romney was an extremely successful (but unexciting) businessman, then he managed to fly in and rescue the 2002 Olympic Winter Games, then he had a successful single term as Governor of Massachusetts and went out on a high.
So on paper he is what Americans would want, but in reality, he is just a bit too dull, he is the cookie-cutter presidential stereotype, which could make him look a bit distant to the average American, being a practicing Mormon won't help to make those outside Utah feel like he is "one of us". He also has no experience to hold up on foreign affairs, but considering that whatever position you adopt, Iraq is political kryptonite, maybe that is no bad thing.
Do to his chronic dullness, what Romney can't really do is provide charismatic inspiration, so he risks being sidelined by some of the more nutty candidates who will get more of the airtime. The democratic candidates have managed to generate more interest at the moment, but that is partly because some of their candidates are not dull grey-haired white men in suits.
هي: إنت عندك كام سنة؟
أنا: 72
هي: لا كام بجد؟ متبقاش رخم!!ـ
إحساس سخيف لما حد يتهمك إنك رخم من أول لقاء بينكو
أنا:عندي 27سنة.. وانتي كام سنة؟
هي: عندي 53سنة
ابتسامة بعد تفكير: آااه.. عندك 35سنة :-)، شفتي أنا ناصح ازاي
**
(2) الريس بيرة مات
أنا: تعرف إيه معنى وفاة الريس بيرة؟؟
هو: مين الريس بيرة ده؟؟
أنا: ده مؤلف أشهر أغاني عدوية، مات عنده ستة وتمانين سنة... عارف معنى وفاته إيه؟؟ إنه النهارده مات شارع محمد علي، ومات ابن البلد، النهاردة انتصر أهالي شبرا الخيمة.. وبتوع العنب على أهالي الجمالية والدرب الاحمر.. وبتوع التفاح
هو: معاك حق
**
(3) ازي حضرتك؟
أنا: ألو ازي حضرتك.. أنا (...)ـ
هي: ازيك.. اخبارك إيه؟ الحمدلله؟
الخط بيقطع، وبتوصلني آخر كلمة في الجملة.. بتقول: كلمني.. أوكيه
أنا: أيوه فعلا انا من مدة عايز أكلم حضرتك، فيه كام موضوع عايز أعرضهم عليكي..ـ
هي: ماشي...... كذا حاجة... بكرة ..عشرة حكون موجودة... أوكيه
أنا : إن شاء الله.. مع السلامة
**
(4) الصف الثاني الثانوي
للمرة الأولى في حياتي أجلس ضمن الصف الأول في فصل 2/15في مدرستي الثانوية، وعلى يميني الأستاذ عمرو خالد الذي استغل غياب أستاذ المادة وقدم لنا درسا وعظيا.. كنت جالسا أمامه مباشرة، وطلب مني أن أرجع إلى الصفوف الخلفية، حيث كانت هناك فتاة وحيدة، تعجبت لوجودها في مدرسة ثانوية بنين، وعلى شاشة عرض عملاقة دار حوار بين الأستاذ عمرو خالد ومجدي إمام تحت شعار قناة روتانا.. لم استيقظ إلا بعد أن أدركت غرابة الأحداث
**
(5) قضاء وقدر
دخل جلال إلى المنزل القدييييم يحمل بيده كيلو بسبوسة، سأل شابا يجلس على السلم عن الحاجة أم جمال، ففاجأه الشاب بطعنة غادرة، استلقى جلال وهو محتفظ بالسكين في صدره.. ابتسم ونعي نفسه ولعن سوء حظه، في الوقت الذي وصل إلى مسامعه صراخ أهل الحارة وهم يركضون وراء سيد المجنون

It’s ridiculous how much CPU speed you need to edit full 1080p AVCHD clips with Vegas. I got my hands on a 1920×1080/60i 14mbps AVCHD clip today and it plays back on the Vegas Pro timeline at ~2 fps on my P4 3Ghz (in “preview/auto” quality). Vegas only supports basic DirectDraw functions, so a faster GPU won’t help either.
Now think that the fastest affordable PC on the market is a Quad-Core Intel at 3Ghz, which is about 5 to 6 times faster than my PC (including bus/RAM speed). Now, multiply that: 6*2fps=12 fps. This means that even the fastest PC on the market today won’t give me full preview speed while editing AVCHD. I would need double that speed. And that’s before adding any plugins or transitions that slow-down preview even more.
Someone might suggest the way Apple does things: all imported footage gets re-encoded to AIC or ProRes codec before editing which are faster to edit/playback. You will have to wait for the transcoding to take place of course, and that will take quite some time for ProRes (it’s faster with AIC, but AIC is not lossless so I can’t recommend it).
So in essense, you have the choice: do you want to wait while importing in the beginning, or wanna wait while editing? In both cases, there’s gonna be stalling. This means only one thing: I will have to wait for a few more years before I decide to get an AVCHD camera and a new PC. For now, the HV20 with its faster-edited M2T format will suffice.
بيقولك بودا كان راجل ابن ملك ومن طائفة محاربين,قرر انه يسيب مراته وابنه ويمشي ويحاول يستغنى.
مش حياكل حاجه حيه,مش حيقتل,حيجوع نفسه,وحيعمل حاجات ياما تتماشي مع قيمه.
Big day tomorrow! I waited 8 months for it, to find a band that I both like, and they would like me to shoot a music video clip for them. So tomorrow, I will be shooting my first music video clip. I can’t wait!
The indie band is a Bay Area native one, they are called HIJK, and they rock! Download some of their songs for free here or buy their album on iTunes. The band already has a video for their first single out of their “The Pen and letter” album, called “Paper boat” (also a free download). They filmed it themselves, and edited it very nicely together. Very creative! Tomorrow, we will be shooting a video for the song “Alibi”. My idea for the video is a more conservative “alt.rock music clip”, which will hopefully pan out ok as I don’t have a 35mm adapter yet (I expect one in a few weeks) and I have not even seen the shooting place yet. I will have to improvise immediately tomorrow after I arrive at the set.
These are the tools that I will have with me tomorrow to materialize the shoot: an audio CD that has the song “Alibi” recorded spent up 125%, a CD player, a camera bag, the Canon HV20 camera, 2 camera batteries fully charged, our new lights, our deflector, my shoulder bracket, my tripod, my steadycam, my WD-H43 wide-angle lens, my 43-to-52mm step-up ring, polarizer/ND/contrast filters, my HDTV-fx Tiffen film-look filter, lens cleanser and brush, 3-4 tapes, our white balance gray card, a Kodak digicam for tests, and a hat (as we will also be shooting outdoors).
Wish me luck! I will need it as I will be shooting “blind”.
Simplelist is a simple method of getting lists of content to display in pages or blocks on your site. It doesn't try to do everything, instead it relies on node_load to pull in node data and node_view or a theme function to display it. As such, it doesn't require any special coding to use a custom module with Simplelist - it just works.
For example, you could create a block to display 10 images in order of highest ranking or most recent comment, or create a private page containing all nodes submitted by a user in a particular role.

It’s now widely recognized that social protest has become a staple of Egyptian politics, what some journalists and researchers have taken to calling an emergent “culture of protest” among an aggrieved citizenry. Opinions differ on when to date the formation of this ‘culture.’ Some date it to 2002 with the pro-Palestine solidarity protests, others to 2004 with labour protests and the birth of Kifaya, still others to 2005 with the mobilisation accompanying the presidential and parliamentary elections. I’m inclined to see it as a grand wave of protest that began in 2000 with several triggers, including the recession and the outbreak of al-Aqsa Intifada. But even more important than the issue of dating protests is interpreting their causes and effects. Since 2005 when pundits dubbed protests a phenomenon, there have been several stock ideas repeated over and over again as if they were self-evident. I want to focus on four that are especially egregious, ideas that are quick to either laud or dismiss protest but are no help in understanding it.
The four myths can be roughly divided into two that are chiefly concerned with the causes of protest and two with its effects. The bad ideas about protest causes assert that: a) the government allows protest as a safety valve and b) that social protest is not about politics, it’s about survival. The bad ideas about protest effects claim that a) widespread protest will topple Mubarak’s regime and b) protest will lead to democracy.
A Grand Wave of Protest
First a few remarks about the current protest wave. It’s not the first such protest surge in the country’s political history, but recalls earlier moments of heightened social conflict in 1946-1952, 1968-1972, and 1977-1980 when various sectors of the population took to the streets to make a variety of claims. What is unique about the current wave is that it’s longer in duration and broader in scope, oscillating between intense peaks and extended troughs. It can be classified categorically, with electoral, rural, industrial, sectarian, cost-of-living, and democracy protests as some of the obvious categories. It can also be broken down into sets of distinct protest issues, participants, and techniques. Spatially, protest is now commonplace in diverse social locations, from campuses to villages to shop floors to marketplaces to schoolyards to train stations, and on the steps of ministries, police stations, courthouses, professional unions, agricultural cooperatives, municipal buildings, and—intriguingly—parliament. This is not counting the street, the public square, and now the highway as commonsense locations for social protest.

We know all this because of the rise of a competitive field of independent media in the past few years that has featured excellent coverage of protest events. Photographs and footage of angry, demonstrating citizens make for juicy teasers that attract more viewers and readers, so editors have their own incentives to cover protest. But increased news coverage has salutary effects: it generates more opinion pieces, more demands on government officials to explain their policies, and more incentives for protesters to clarify (and sometimes escalate) their demands. I’ve always been a news junkie, but reading the independent papers and watching the satellite channels these days is unusually edifying, revealing the extraordinary range of social problems and popular collective action that the government wants hidden or distorted. Consider this random selection of protest events culled from recent news reports: car repairmen amass in front of a police station to protest the municipality’s forcible closure of their workshops; displaced residents of Kafr al-Elw protest in front of parliament to demand compensation housing; three months earlier, Port Said residents had done the same; 300 Basateen families congregate at the Abdeen courthouse to publicise their suit against the municipality for ordering their houses demolished; Beheira villagers erect a road blockade for five hours to protest the killing of a woman and child, blaming a police official for their death; residents of Ezbet Khairallah protest in front of the Cairo governorate building, blaming officials for failing to provide potable water and trash collection.
Fortunately for us press junkies, both the independent and the government media also offer outlets for all sorts of ideas about protest, the good, the bad, and the banal. Let’s focus on the bad.
Bad Ideas
1. Widespread social protest will destabilize or topple Mubarak’s regime. This may be the heartfelt wish of anti-Mubarak activists and the worst nightmare for Mubarak’s rotten shilla, that Egypt will be another Iran circa 1978-1979 or the Philippines in 1986 or Serbia in 2000. It’s especially tempting given that protests characterized Nasser and Sadat’s final years in power, and Mubarak’s succession problem further nourishes the notion that his regime is particularly unstable. For example, both times that demonstrators tore down and destroyed the huge posters of Mubarak (in Cairo in 2003 and Mahalla in 2008), some commentators feared or hoped that this prefigured an actual ouster.
It’s certainly possible for social protests to remove autocrats from power, but it’s definitely not inevitable nor common. It’s doubtful that Reza Shah or Ferdinand Marcos were brought down by protests alone. Retrospective accounts may stress the defining role of a tremendous popular revolt, but in reality the autocrats’ downfall was the outcome of a years-long process of regime disintegration, including defection of key regime loyalists, economic and fiscal crisis, and a withdrawal in American support.
There are a host of other problems with this idea, but the worst in my view is the implication that protests are only significant insofar as they affect regime “stability,” anything else is irrelevant. This leads to assertions that either exaggerate or belittle protest events to suit one’s political commitments. Thus, activists see in every public demonstration or worker collective action a direct threat to Mubarak’s survival, and regime supporters ridicule every protest as futile, insignificant and/or dangerous. It’s easy to see how this can devolve into a shouting match or the worst sort of cocktail party political chatter, since it’s impossible to predict when or precisely how a regime collapses except after the fact. In the meantime, all the important but unsexy issues are ignored, such as how protestors articulate their claims, how authorities respond, whether (and what kind of) a compromise is worked out, and whether (and how) protest spreads to more societal sectors. Assessing protest exclusively by its impact on regime stability is the favoured activity of intelligence agencies and “political risk” firms (whatever those are), but is not a serious way to understand any political phenomenon.
2. The government allows protest as a safety valve. A position shared by both pro- and anti-government activists, this common dismissal was routine in 2005 when Kifaya was holding demonstrations nearly every week. When it’s explicitly articulated (and it rarely is), the reasoning goes something like this: Mubarak tolerates limited forms of protest either to stave off greater unrest or to deflect international pressure or as a barometer to gauge societal discontent. All of these are cogent reasons, and there’s no doubt that tolerating certain forms of protest is useful for the Mubarak regime. But the notion that the current protest wave is somehow part of a coherent plan by the regime and has been “allowed” to continue is bizarre. It grants a mythical amount of omniscience and omnipotence to rulers, ignores their repression of the vast majority of protests, and conceals a very important political development during Mubarak’s tenure: the routinised management and policing of protest.

The well-worn image of Central Security Forces and trucks encircling every public gathering has become so normalised that we forget how Mubarak’s police officials have worked to devise an elaborate and standardised set of procedures to deal with protest, from master plans sealing off greater Cairo in expectation of unusually large gatherings (as during the funeral of the Ikhwan Murshid Ma’moun al-Hodeiby in early 2004) to street-level tactics like the horrific corralling and then squashing of demonstrators by CSF recruits. Anyone who’s been at a demo has observed the intricacies of protest management, how police commanders and amn al-dawla officers work the crowd, consulting with their superiors via walkie-talkie, negotiating and bantering with the demonstration’s organisers, coordinating with the hired plainclothes thugs, and giving orders to recruits to attack (or refrain from attacking) protestors. It’s not unusual for the Interior Ministry’s all-important Cairo security chief to go into the field and supervise crowd management himself: recall Nabil al-Ezabi’s frequent shouting matches with Kifaya leaders in 2005 (he was later rewarded with the governorship of Assiut), and Ismail al-Shaer’s hands-on management of the pro-judges’ protests in spring 2006 and the 6 April general strike this year.
I don’t pretend to know the details of protest policing strategies hatched in Mubarak’s fortress-like Interior Ministry, but I know that they exist and are bankrolled by vast sums in the state budget. I would guess that they’re a combination of staple tactics inherited from the 1940s, recent innovations emanating from field experiences, and perhaps even the protest policing procedures of other Arab autocracies (the annual Arab Interior Ministers’ conference must be a fun, fun gathering). I’d also conjecture that techniques differ depending on not just the size and location of a protest event but the kind of participants (worker protests are policed differently than elite pro-democracy protests or student demos), the broader political context (the regime’s assessment of risk and threat levels), and the Interior Ministry’s internal bureaucratic politics (I’d give an arm and a leg to be a fly on the wall during their meetings). If we take the protests of 2005 alone, differences between pre-emptive and reactive police repression is immediately clear. Mubarak’s regime doesn’t “allow” protest then, but it does seek to contain, manage, and defuse it, ironically routinising this form of collective action.
3. Social protest is not about politics, it’s about survival. This idea is repeated over and over again as protest spreads to social groups who don’t routinely engage in it and have good reasons for avoiding it, such as the homeless of Qal’at al-Kabsh, Tebbeen, and Qursaya, or the fishermen and farmers in Kafr al-Shaykh and Gharbiyya protesting water scarcity last summer, or the Mahalla youths last month. A sister notion holds that the recent string of protests by doctors, industrial workers, farmers, and tax collectors embody “parochial” demands about wages and working conditions and therefore can’t be classified as important political events.
This is the one of the oldest canards about ordinary people’s collective action, a hoary myth that refuses to die. Not only is it incredibly condescending toward the human striving for a dignified life, but it basically believes that ordinary people are incapable of sustained political thought. It also involves quite a strange conception of politics.
Who said that politics only includes national structures of political power? Politics has always been about local constellations of power, and bread-and-water issues of survival. Politics is involved in any act that makes demands on the rulers and their agents. When homeless poor people amass in front of a municipal building or parliament to demand housing, or when Borollos villagers block a highway for 12 hours to compel their governor to supply them with potable water, or when Qursaya islanders cling to the soil to resist eviction by the army, they’re not “just” fighting for survival. As is obvious to anyone who pays attention, they’re making concrete demands on state officials, regardless of the specific issues at play. If that’s not political, I really don’t know what is. When workers strike to demand increased wages and food allowances, they’re making demands on management, yes, but they’re also demanding that the state either step in and force management to make concessions or enforce a breached compact or regulate exploitative work conditions. Demanding fair wages and defending other “parochial” interests is just as political as establishing a political party or insisting that Hosni Mubarak step down.
A final thought: I’m not convinced by the oft-made, strained argument that economic protests somehow “spill over” into political protests through some vague process of osmosis or something. Economic claims are already political by virtue of targeting government officials, policies, and interests in some fashion or another.
4. Protest will lead to democracy. Let me confess right away that I have a soft spot for this myth and constantly catch myself revelling in it. The reasoning is that more protest leads to more people voicing demands, which leads to more opportunities for powerholders to be subjected to popular consultation, which constrains their power and therefore promotes democracy.

This is most likely right, but only half the time. The other and probably more common outcome is greater repression and a contraction rather than expansion of democratisation. The key flaw with the more protest equals more democracy thesis is that it wrongly equates protestors’ claims with protest outcomes. However, claims are one thing, consequences are something else. We can’t judge protests by their claims, but by their indirect effects. For example, Kifaya and allied social movements demand that Mubarak step down, refrain from handing power to his son, and convoke competitive, free and fair elections. This has not happened. Do we then judge Kifaya’s impact by its failure to oust Mubarak and install democracy? That would be ludicrous, but it would also be wrong to assume that since Kifaya was a pro-democracy movement, it automatically added an increment of democracy to Egyptian politics. The fact is that the consequences of Kifaya’s protests are two-pronged: on one hand, they effectively set the agenda of public discourse for at least a year and acted as a counterweight to the Ikhwan. One the other, and contrary to movement members’ intentions, Kifaya’s protests increased the regime’s repression of democracy-seeking coalitions and may have improved the government’s capacity to throttle future such coalitions in their cradle. It’s not clear yet which of Kifaya’s effects will prevail, the point is that pro-democracy claims do not unambiguously result in pro-democracy consequences.
It also works the other way round: anti-democracy protest claims may paradoxically result in more democratization, if they spur counter-movements to mobilise, thus bringing more participants into the political space and routinising protest as a form of collective pressure on public authorities. The example of Egypt in the inter-war period comes to mind here, with its diverse set of political-ideological groups all taking to the streets and forming coalitions with parliamentary factions, competing with each other for political standing and influence: Ikhwan, Misr al-Fatah, the congeries of socialists and communists, the Wafd and its factions, and endless splinter groups and underground societies. Some were avowedly pro-democracy and others were vocally anti-democracy, but their combined effect on politics was democratising by increasing the numbers of politically active citizens and forcing government accountability through periodic elections.
Ultimately, the consequences of protest on democratisation is very difficult to gauge, precisely because protest has the dual effects of on one hand expanding political participation and subjecting rulers to popular consultation and on the other provoking popular fear of ‘chaos’ and inviting greater state repression. However, we can see the connection more clearly if we don’t confuse protest claims with protest effects. Important mediating factors always step in, confounding intentions.
A Good Idea
So now that I’ve so arrogantly proclaimed some ideas to be so bad, what, pray, are the good ideas?! For starters, the current protest wave needs to be carefully documented; constructing a comprehensive catalogue of protest events is fortunately now feasible, given extensive media coverage and various research and human rights groups’ tracking of protest incidents for some years now. Once we have the information, we can begin the analysis, looking for salient patterns, identifying the likely causes of protest, tracking changes in its morphology, explaining how it diffuses, and understanding government containment strategies. Regarding causes, we know that privatization has triggered the frequent labour strikes, so we can conjecture that government and/or business resource-grabs such as increased taxation and land appropriation are propelling citizens to protest; think of the remarkable Dumyat mobilisation against the planned Agrium facility, or Qursaya islanders’ mobilisation last year, the Dahab and Warraq islanders’ protests in 2001, or traders’ protest against the sales tax in 2001.
Morphological analysis might include constructing typologies of protest claims, protest targets, and protest locations. It ought to examine innovation and diffusion in specific protest techniques, such as my favourite tactic: the increasing resort to protests in front of parliament. There’s also the spread of the internationally resonant candlelight protest, or the intriguing sash phenomenon, which the judges first started in spring 2006, then the Ikhwan MPs mimicked it in their protests against the Lebanon war in August 2006, then it was diffused to opposition MPs protesting the constitutional amendments in March 2007, then Giza lawyers picked it up when they protested lack of courtroom space last autumn, and who knows who’ll borrow it next?

There are so many ways to describe and interpret Egypt’s protest wave, isn’t it a great shame to keep invoking the same reductive, anaemic ideas, ignoring all the rich empirical information right under our noses? In other times and places, sustained protest waves illuminated the intersection between politics and everyday life, tracked momentous changes in political structures and economic organisation, and midwifed new ways of doing politics. Above all, protest waves always transformed relations between citizens and government agents. Beyond their momentous effects, protest waves are intrinsically fascinating. The phenomena of ordinary people struggling to preserve their honour and dignity, organising to make forceful demands on those who control their fates and livelihoods, activating their citizenship, this is an awesome thing to behold.
To the memory of CT, with love and grief.
Photos from al-Badeel, al-Karama, Associated Press.

Stormrider challenges me with the following survey:
* How many years do you use a computer for?
About 16.
* Are you a newbie, casual user, power user, master, umber, jedi?
Power.
* What’s your main computer?
A Dell Hyperthreaded 3.06 Ghz P4.
* Do you put together your own PCs?
I used to, but I don’t bother anymore. I buy them ready.
* Have you ever broken a computer because of your anger?
Naah.
* What browser are you using?
Firefox on the PC, Safari on the Mac.
* What media player are you using?
WinAMP and iTunes.
* What mail client are you using?
The shit called Windows Live Mail.
* What IM client are you using?
Trillian and Adium.
* Do you run add-ons?
No.
* What anti-virus do you run?
AVG Free Edition.
* Favorite software
Outlook Express is not the most secure software, but it’s solid as a rock.
* Favorite software house:
Google
* Most hated software house:
Electronic Arts
* Favorite hardware company:
Apple
* Most hated hardware company:
Anything cheapo Asian, including HTC.
* Favorite geek PC usage:
None anymore.
* Dream-machine?
The fastest PC you can find to edit AVCHD in real time.
* Was your first video you saw on a PC porn?
Nope.
* Do you modify other people’s PCs when you use them?
Ah yeah, I need to “fix” things.
* Anything embarrassing in your Trash Bin?
Not much.
* Do you spend useless time opening/closing windows in your OS?
Naah…
SmartCache is a js and css gzip & cache script.
It mantains an updated cache of every js and css file on your site and serves it to browsers supporting http compression.
SmartCache generates Expire Headers too!
SmartCache is a stripped down and polished revision of JSmart, from Ali Farhadi. Kudos to him for developing this script at first.
Why use SmartCache versus mod_gzip?First and foremost: not every server supports mod_gzip. If that is the case, SmartCache is for you.
Even if you use have access to mod_gzip, if you cannot configure his caching funcionality or think they are too limited, you could find SmartCache a useful little tool. Or at least, I hope so ;).
imagefield_import.module will allow users with the proper role to be able to import a large number of images into a CCK content type that contains an imagefield.
The user can configure the node type and target imagefield that the images will be imported
into using the settings form at admin/settings/imagefield_import
FTP/SSH access is required to upload the photos to an import folder that you set up in your file structure.
The image.module, or image_import.module will likely cause conflicts.
This module requires imagefield and CCK.
Regarding my previous post about the recovery mode security hole :
http://phaeronix.net/content/crappy-security
where some people didn't believe me, an update was just pushed that fixes this:
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/friendly-recovery/+bug/220986
إبراهيم عبد الغني posted a photo:
لا لم تشتعل يدها و لكنه الفلاش
:)
إنها ندى العفريته
FedEx is using Drupal for their news website. Not bad because FedEx is ranked in the top 100 of the Fortune 500. Hat tip: Jeff Whatcott. This module provides Webmoney payment gateway through merchant.webmoney.ru website, when using Drupal Ubercart.
It was developed and tested for Ubercart 5.x-1.0-rc4.
Important! PHP have to support PEAR with extensions:
XML-Util
XML-Serializer
XML-Parser
format forms using Panels to very quickly layout forms exactly how you need them to be laid out.
How To Add WiKID Two-Factor Authentication To The Astaro Security Gateway
Astaro is a very popular Linux-based "all-in-one" security appliance offering spam filtering, malware protection, firewall, VPN, etc. The WiKID Strong Authentication Server is a dual-source two-factor authentication system. PINs are encrypted on a software token and sent to the WiKID server. If the PIN is correct, the encryption valid and the account active, a one-time password is generated, encrypted and returned to the user's token where it is decrypted and presented for use with a network-based services. This document will show how to add WiKID two-factor authentication to the Astaro Security Gateway version 7 using Radius.
Read more...
ما حدث لهديل كان يمر أمامي و كأنه حلم، فخبر غيبوبتها منذ قرأته على عشرات المدونات لم أشأ أن أؤمن به و أصدقه، فأنا لست متابع جيد لما تكتب و لكن أمرها و ما حدث لها - كأى فتاه شابه فى أوائل العشرينات - لا يمكن أن يتقبله عقلي بسهوله.
الأب يستيقظ على صوت رنين المنبه فى غرفة إبنته و هى لم تصحو بعد.
يذهب فيدق الباب عليها فلم يأته رد ….
لم تمر لحظه حتى دخل و القلق يملؤه فيجد وجه أبنته النضر و قد ملأته الزرقه و توقف قلبها عن الخفقان !!
ثم أيام قليلة بين يدي الأطباء لتنتقل بعدهن إلى حياة أبديه بين يدي الرحمن !!
رحمة الله عليك يا أخيتي .. غفر الله لكى ما تقدم من ذنبك و ما تأخر و رزق أهلك الصبر على قدر البلاء
In Chapter 1, I gave a brief overview of the Autotools and some of the resources that are currently available to help reduce the learning curve. In this chapter, we’re going to step back a little and examine project organization techniques that are applicable to all projects, not just those whose build system is managed by the Autotools.
The application server GlassFish supports all the most modern and juicy features of Java Enterprise Edition (EE), formally known as J2EE. Made by Sun, the server has a dual purpose as both the official application server reference for Java EE and as a viable and scalable piece of software that performs well under most conditions. David R. Heffelfinger’s book “Java EE 5 Development using Glassfish”, published by PACKT, follows both purposes by exploring the frameworks and the server deployment; thus the books details resonate vigorously with the spirit behind the tool.
While it's a bit late and almost the entire readership of my blog already knows this, last week I gave an interview to Jeff Robbins of Lullabot, for podcast #58. I hadn't been on the Lullabot podcast since the very first one, and that time it was an interview at Vancouver that wasn't quite as comfortable.
One feature that I am missing from iTunes (in addition to this one, of course) is “music collections”. We have 5 iPods in our household, and I am using 3 of them (16 GB iPod Touch, 8 GB iPhone, and 4 GB iPod Mini). I would like to use different iPods for each kind of music. For example, one iPod for commercially bought pop/rock music, one for freeware indie rock music, and one for electronic/dance. As I am a bit of a control freak, I just don’t like them mixed up because they don’t sound the same. Plus, not all my music+videos fit on my iPod Touch or the iPhone, so I am using all 3 devices.
Each time that I purchase, or rip, or add a new song in my iTunes library, I would like to be able to have the option to drop them into a specific collection of music. I know that there are smart playlists that you can possibly sort via “genre”, but thing is, each ripped CD or download features a different name for a genre. For example, for what I perceive overall as “indie rock”, it might be tagged as alternative, grudge, garage, alt.rock, rock, hard rock etc etc. So I can’t possibly go and change the tags of 5,000+ songs one by one. Instead, I need an easier drag-n-drop solution (while I am building the library) that keeps things separately: music collections. And each iPod would sync to one of these.
I understand that when iTunes first came out this feature didn’t make much sense, but 7 years into the iPod times, some people tend to have a whole collection of them. So I am pretty sure I am not alone in this request.

عندما كان صغيرا , كان يتوق لتلك الأيام التى يصبح فيها كبيرا , قادرا على الإستيعاب والفهم كالكبار .. فقط ليحل كل الألغاز التى يراها حوله , ولا يجد لها تفسيرا على الإطلاق …
بدأ الأمر عندما كان فى سن الثامنه أو التاسعه .. كان منزلهم يمتلىء بالعديد من الرجال والنساء متجمهى الوجوه , لا يداعبونه إطلاقا , وكان يتعجب من هذا الحزم الذى يعاملونه به , مقارنه بالحب والحنان الذى يغدقونه عليه عندما يقابلونه صدفه فى الشارع , بينما يلعب مع اقرانه …
كانوا يأتون إلى المنزل , حيث يعيش هو ووالدته , يدخلون غرفه (الصالون) أو غرفه المسافرين كما إعتادت جدته المسنه أن تسميها , فلا يسمع من بعدها إلا أصوات عاليه متداخله , مع الكثير من (دى بقت عيشه تقرف) أو (أنا مبقتش مستحمل العيشه مع الست دى) ….
حاول مرارا وتكررا أن يدخل إلى الغرفه المغلقه , إلا أن أياد كثيره كانت تمتد لتمنعه قبل أن يكشف السر الغامض على إدراكه .. وعندما كان يسألهم عن طبيعه ما يحدث بالداخل , إما يطمأنونه كاذبين بأن كل شىء على ما يرام , أو يخبرونه بلهجه حاسمه أنه سيعرف كل شىء عندما سيكبر …
عندها .. كان ينزوى فى أحد الأركان , ويتمنى أن يغمض عينه ويفتحها فيجد نفسه رجلا كبيرا ممن يراهم يحضرون متجهمين , حتى يستطيع أن يدخل الى حيث الغرفه المغلقه .. ويعرف بالظبط سر ما يحدث بالداخل …
بعدها كانت أمه تخرج مسرعه من الغرفه وهى تبكى , بينما يندفع ابوه مغادرا الشقه فى حنق , بينما تعلق بذراعه بعض الرجال محاولين إعادته إلى داخل المنزل مره أخرى بلا جدوى …
ولم تكن أمه تحدثه عن أى شىء .. كانت تضمه إلى صدرها وتطفىء النور … فينام بعد دقائق , ولا يزال صوت بكاءها الحار يدوى فى أذنه .. رغم محاولاتها كتمان صوتها عنه …
حاول مرارا وتكرارا سؤالها عن سر بكاءها المستمر , فكانت تجيبه أنه سيعرف حين يكبر …. حينها كان يقضى الليالى فى حضن أمه الدافىء , متمنيا أن يجرى به العمر ويكبر … ويعرف الحقيقه التى يخفيها عنه الجميع ويستطيع حينها أن يسرى عن أمه …
وفى أحد الأيام حضر إلى المنزل نفس الرجال المتجهمين … ونفس النساء المكتئبه , إلا أنهم هذه المره إصطحبوا شيخا مسنا يرتدى عمامه بيضاء على رأسه .. دخلوا الغرفه وأغلقوها على أنفسهم جيدا .. أقسم هذه المره أن يعرف ما الذى يدور بالداخل .. وضع أذنه بمحاذاه الباب ليحاول إستراق السمع … لم يسمع سوى صوت الشيخ المسن وهو يقول بحزم : يا جماعه شاوروا نفسكم .. ده ابغض الحلال عند الله !
كالعاده لم يعى شيئا .. إلا أنه أدرك بالغريزه أن شيئا كبيرا يحدث حوله , وهو الوحيد الذى لا يعرف شيئا … كل هذا بسبب كونه لايزال صغيرا ….
إنتهت جلسه الناس فى منزلهم هذه المره بسرعه … كالعاده رحل والده سريعا دون أن يعيره أى إنتباه .. بينما غادر الرجال المنزل بسرعه واحدا تلو الاخر … بقى النساء بجانب أمه يحاولن أن يخففن عنها مصيبه لا يعلمها .. ويضمدون جراحا نفسية لا يعى مدى خطورتها …
ومر اليوم كباقى الأيام … ضمته إلى صدرها وأخذت تبكى … بينما هو يلعن صغر سنه الذى يجعله غير قادر على الفهم إلى هذا الحد …
ومن يومها إنقطعت زيارات المتجهمين والمكتئبين إلى منزلهم … ربما استمرت لمده يوم أو إثنين بعد هذه الزياره الحاسمة , ثم توقف كل شىء بغته , وكإنما سقط هو وأمه فى هوة النسيان فلم يعد يتذكرهما احد …
ومرت الأيام كئيبه حزينه … كانت أمه تخرج به إلى السوق لتشترى إحتياجات المنزل , وكان يسمع عبارات غريبه تتبادلها امه مع البائع .. عبارات من طراز : اصبر عليا شويه يا حاج ده الدنيا اتخلقت فى ست ايام … أو أن يقول لها البائع جملا طويله .. لا يفهم منها سوى كلمات متفرقه مثل : حسابك تقل أوى .. انا فاتحها دكان مش جمعيه خيريه …
وعندما كان يسألها عن سر هذه الشجارات المتكرره , كانت تقول له جملتها المعهوده : لما تكبر هتفهم …
وفى الأيام التاليه , بدا يشعر ببعض التغيرات فى حياته … أصبحت الوجبات التى تقدمها له امه تتباعد الفترات الزمنيه بينها شيئا فشيئا .. حتى أنه فى بعض الأيام كان يتناول طعام الغذاء فقط فلا يتناول الإفطار أو العشاء , حتى وجبه يوم الخميس التى تكون عامره باللحوم أو الدواجن إختفت هذه الاصناف المحببه اليه من المائده لتحل محلها صنوف الجبن القديم والعيش البائت ….
كان يلعن كل يوم كونه مايزال صغيرا غير قادرا على فهم كل هذه التغيرات حوله , إلا أنه كان يشعر أن أمه فى ورطه , وأنه يجب أن يساندها .. فقط لو كان أكبر قليلا
ومرت الأيام على نفس المنوال … نهار ملىء بالمشكلات والشجارات , وليل ملىء بالدموع والتنهيدات …
حتى جاء صباح إستيقظ فيه فلم يجد نفسه بين أحضان أمه … بحث عنها فى كل مكان فلم يجدها .. ومن ركن بعيد من منزلهم خرج عليه وجه مألوف .. أنه البائع الذى كانت امه تتشاجر معه منذ عده ايام …
أستقبله الرجل هاشا باشا على غير العاده .. عندما كان يقذفه بالتالف من بضاعته إذا رأه يلعب بالقرب من دكانه … أعطاه الرجل ورقتين كل منها فئه الجنيه .. وقال له : خد ياض .. اشترى حاجه حلوه لأمك …
قطع حديثه خروج والدته من الحمام للتو … وقد لفت شعرها بفوطه مهترئه , وتساقط الماء من شعيراتها كورده إرتوت منذ لحظه … إلا أن البائع توقف لحظه عن الحديث ثم سرعان ما استكمل جملته وهو ينظر لأمه قائلا : أمك دى تستاهل كل خير …
هكذا طار إلى حيث بائع الحلويات , وإشترى ما كان يشعر بالحرمان منه … وعندما عاد وجد أمه قد حضرت طعام الغذاء … خضروات شهيه من التى يبيعها هذا الرجل فى دكانه …
وفى الأيام التاليه شعر بإنفراجه حقيقيه فى حياته … ارسلته امه الى الجزار فى اول الشارع وأخبرته أن يقول للرجل : هات الأمانه بتاعه امى … ورغم أنه لم يفهم حرفا من هذه الرساله , الا ان الرجل اعطاه كيسا من اللحم المختلط بالدهن … وهكذا تناول اللحم فى طعام الغداء بعد شهور من القحط …
وفى أحد الأيام , استيقظ من نومه بعد منتصف الليل وقد أحرقته مثانته المليئه بالبول .. فى الطريق الى الحمام سمع صوت أمه صادرا من حجره النوم .. كانت تتأوه كأنما يضربها أحدهم ضربا عنيفا .. اقترب من الباب المغلق فسمع الصوت أكثر وضوحا .. وخطر فى باله أنه ربما أحد اللصوص يحاول سرقه والدته فأسرع يفتح الباب ففوجىء به مغلقا من الداخل .. وبعد لحظات خرجت عليه أمه منزعجه للغايه , وقد ارتدت قميص النوم الضيق الذى كفت عن ارتداؤه منذ كان ابوه يتردد على المنزل فى نهايه كل اسبوع …
اصطحبته الى الحمام واسرعت به الى حيث غرفته , سالها عن حقيقه ما يحدث فى غرفتها فقالت له أنها كانت تحلم أن هناك من يضربها .. لمح فى عينها الكذب فقالت له جملتها المعروفه : لما تكبر هتعرف !
وفى اليوم التالى توقف صاحب المنزل عن المطالبه بالإيجار المتاخر ….
ومرت الايام وإزدادت حالتهم إنتعاشا .. إلا أن المشكلات استمرت بشكل متقطع بين امه وبين بعض النسوه .. كالعاده لم يدر لماذا تدور كل هذه المشاجرات والمشاحنات .. سمع كلمات متناثره عن (الوليه الفاجره) أو شىء من هذا القبيل , وعندما سأل أمه عن معنى هذه الأحاديث , أخبرته أنه سيعرف كل شىء عندما سيكبر …
أصبح يكره هذه الإجابه التى لا تنفك أمه تخبره بها فى كل وقت … لما تكبر هتعرف .. لما تكبر هتعرف … صار يتمنى أن يغمض عينه ويفتحها فيجد نفسه كبيرا قد عرف كل شىء ..
كان يريد أن يعرف سر إصرار أمه أن ينام قبل الحاديه عشر كل يوم حتى فى أيام الأجازه المدرسيه .. كان يريد ان يعرف سر هذه العلامات الزرقاء التى تظهر على رقبه أمه وذراعيها أحيانا .. ولماذا يزورها الجزار وبائع الخضار ومحصل الكهرباء وصاحب المنزل كثيرا حتى المدرسين الخصوصين والحلاق الذى يحلق له شعره كانوا يأتون لأمه ويمكثون لديها حتى موعد نومه , فينام دون أن يلاحظهم يغادرون المنزل ؟ كان يريد أن يعرف لماذا يتغامز الناس عليه فى الشارع , بينما يطرده بعض الباعه من محلاتهم بالرغم من أنهم يحضرون لزيارة امه فى المنزل كثيرا ؟! , ويشتمه أقرانه وينعتونه بإبن (الشرمـ…..) …..
وفى أحد الايام أصيبت أمه بمرض غريب … ذهبت إلى المستشفى الحكومى وهو بصحبتها , فعاملها الجميع بإزدراء , على الرغم من المعامله المتوسطه الجوده التى يلقاها المرضى الأخرين, وهددها أحد الأطباء بكلمات لم يفهم الكثير منها بسبب سرعه تحدث الطبيب الشاب .. كانت الكلمات تتطاير من فمه فتصيب روح أمه وتدميها بقوه أكبر من قوه الرزاز المتطاير من فم الطبيب الثائر … سمع كلمات مثل (إنتى عارفه وأنا عارف الى عندك ده من إيه) , أو عبارات التهكم من الأطباء الشباب تحت التمرين والتى كانوا يسقطون أرضا من شده الضحك بعد كل (أفيه) يطلقونه على أمه المريضه .. وكان كالعاده لا يفهم سر ضحكهم المبالغ فيه أمام والدته … كأن يقول أحدهم : (يظهر الزبون المره دى كان شديد اوى) ….
.. وتم حجز أمه فى أحد العنابر القذرة .. وقرأ بصعوبه بالغه اللوحه القذره على مدخل العنبر التى كتب عليها بخط نسخ (عنبر مرضى الزهرى) … وفاجأتها حمى غريبه وطفح جلدى … فسهر بجوارها يبكى ويبكى …
وكان أخر سؤال وجهه لها : إنتى عندك ايه يا ماما ؟
وكانت أخر كلماتها فى الحياه : لما تكبر هتفهم !
تمت
Stormrider posted a very interesting and as always, right-in-the-mark blog post.
If you want to see what’s wrong with many Greek people today, you simply have to look at one person, who happens to be a good representative of the bunch: Mikis Theodorakis. He is an internationally known composer, and a politician. Even if you might never heard his name, you probably have heard his music somewhere.
And you don’t have to know him to judge him. You just need to read his — pretty objectively written — Wikipedia page (towards the bottom).
Let me vomit now.